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Why Do Firms Fail to Engage Diversity? A Behavioral Strategy Perspective
Abstract
Persistent failure to engage diversity—less favorable treatment of atypical but potentially valuable 
human resources—is puzzling because it implies labor-market inefficiencies and untapped 
opportunities. This paper addresses this puzzle from a behavioral strategy perspective and outlines four 
limits—cognitive, searching, reconfiguring and legitimacy (CSRL)—that deter firms from sensing, 
seizing, integrating and justifying valuable diversity. The case of Moneyball is used to illustrate how 
these CSRL limits prevent mispriced human resources from being arbitraged away sooner, with 
implications for engaging cognitive diversity beyond sports. A behavioral strategy as arbitrage 
perspective illuminates why both justice- and performance-centric perspectives in the diversity 
literature may be counterproductive, failing to address various behavioral/social limits to diversity 
engagement. The paper also discusses how the hype surrounding artificial intelligence is creating 
greater CSRL limits to engaging diversity and, in turn, more untapped opportunities. It contributes to 
the strategy literature by outlining a template for searching for untapped opportunities and also limits 
to exploiting them: While debiasing and strategizing may help overcome some CSRL limits, passing 
all these limits and monopolizing untapped opportunities usually depend more on exaptation and luck.
Keywords: behavioral strategy, diversity, behavioral failures, strategic opportunities, CSRL limits to 
arbitrage
1. Introduction
Although firms are supposed to evaluate employees based on merit, many studies show that well-
qualified workers may not be hired or promoted for reasons irrelevant to merit (van Dijk et al. 2017, 
Eberhardt 2019, Galinsky et al. 2015). Some suboptimal evaluations result from explicit, taste-based 
discrimination (Becker 1971), while others derive from automatic, implicit biases, such as stereotyping 
or homophily (Fiske and Taylor 2013). A statistical account of discrimination (Arrow 1973) suggests 
that when obtaining a reliable signal of individual merit is costly, it is not irrational to predict candidates’ 
merit based on easily observable characteristics, such as age, race or gender. Many scholars urge firms 
to overcome discrimination and engage diversity, with justifications based either on a justice-centric 
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view (e.g., including disadvantaged candidates is the right thing to do to fix decades of prejudice) or on 
a performance-centric view (e.g., recruiting team members with non-overlapping cognitive diversity 
improves performance of complex tasks). Regardless of the mechanisms of discrimination and tactics 
to counter it, research shows that many firms still fail to engage diversity (Dobbin et al. 2015), 
undervaluing qualified but atypical individuals while favoring those who fit positive stereotypes.
Persistent failure to engage diversity is puzzling from a strategy point of view because it implies 
labor-market inefficiency (cf. Barney 1986) and that money is being left on the table (Denrell et al. 
2003). Firms that discriminate are likely to pay a performance penalty for failing to recruit the most 
qualified workers, whereas firms that overcome discrimination may gain advantages (Becker 1971), for 
instance by recruiting atypical workers undervalued by rivals (Liu et al. 2017, Siegel et al. 2018). Over 
time, competition should select out biased firms, correcting labor-market inefficiency, so why do many 
firms still fail to engage diversity? In ther words, why are valuable but atypical human resources, as 
untapped opportunities, not yet arbitraged away?
This paper addresses persistent failure to engage diversity from a behavioral strategy perspective. 
Recent studies integrate various “behavioral failures” to predict when behavioral forces preserve market 
failures and, in turn, untapped behavioral opportunities (Denrell et al. 2019, Gavetti 2012, Zuckerman 
2012). These works share an analogy with behavioral finance, in that rational traders may earn abnormal 
returns by arbitraging mis-evaluations of stocks by “noise traders” who overreact to unexpected and 
dramatic news events (Delong et al. 1990). However, rational traders may not always be able to exploit 
these opportunities when “limits to arbitrage” deter exploitation and hence preserve market 
inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Here, I build on these previous works and propose a 
conceptual framework that outlines four limits to arbitrage—cognitive, searching, reconfiguring and 
legitimacy (CSRL)—in the context of diversity. These CSRL limits help explain the mechanisms that 
allow biases against qualified but atypical (and biases in favor of stereotypical) human resources to 
persist, and illuminate approaches to earn superior returns by overcoming these limits.
The application of CSRL limits to arbitrage is illustrated using the case of Moneyball (Lewis 2003), 
which occurred in the context of Major League Baseball (MLB). Team advantage is strongly associated 
with recruiting superior players who contribute to team wins, yet most teams judge players based on 
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their “look”—whether or not they fit the stereotype of successful players. The Oakland Athletics (the 
A’s) and their manager, Billy Beane exploited this opportunity by acquiring undervalued players (e.g., 
counter-stereotypical but with more competence than implied by their salary) from rivals, and achieved 
impressive winning percentages with almost the lowest payroll in the MLB between 1999 and 2003. 
Moneyball is often portrayed as a triumph of data analytics; yet this is insufficient to explain the A’s 
success, because data on MLB players and the “sabermetric” methods used for analysis had been 
publicly available for decades. A greater puzzle is why such exploitation did not occur sooner. As will 
be elaborated, data analytics is only one of the factors that helped the A’s address the searching limit 
by identifying undervalued players, particularly among the unconventional. Other CSRL limits deterred 
MLB teams from appreciating, imitating or justifying Beane’s approach, allowing the A’s to enjoy 
superior returns until Michael Lewis’s (2003) book helped eliminate several of these limits. This case 
has important implications beyond pr fessional sports: “If Lewis is right about the blunders and the 
confusions of those who run baseball teams, then his tale has a lot to tell us about blunders and 
confusions in many other domains” (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, p. 1390). If the labor market can be 
inefficient in the MLB, where the economic stakes of flawed recruitment are extremely high and there 
is no obvious economic barrier to exploiting inefficiencies, one might expect labor-markets outside 
sports to entail larger mispricing, greater CSRL limits, and more untapped opportunities.
Applying a behavioral strategy perspective to the debate on diversity makes interesting theoretical 
and practical contributions. First, it complements the growing literature on diversity by providing a 
novel lens that sees failure to engage diversity as being protected by various behavioral and social limits 
to arbitrage. Firms fail to engage diversity not necessarily because they disagree with the reasons for 
diversity engagement, such as those based on a normative, justice-centric view (e.g., including workers 
with disadvantaged identities) or a pragmatic, performance-centric view (e.g., complex tasks require 
diverse teams with non-overlapping cognitive repertoires); such failures may result from context-
dependent factors that prevent firms from overcoming CSRL limits. For example, candidates with 
valuable diversity may be ruled out because they do not “look” qualified, or their contributions/outputs 
may be discounted by important stakeholders, such as media, investors and customers. More generally, 
this paper contributes to the literature by providing a distinct behavioral strategy as an arbitrage 
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perspective that complements normative and pragmatic mainstream views. Unpacking and addressing 
CSRL limits holistically is essential for doing the right thing and/or improving performance more 
effectively.
This paper also contributes to the strategy literature by illustrating how strategy theories can be both 
descriptive and prescriptive. Superior performance is usually attributed to firms’ control over valuable 
resources that enable structural advantages or isolate them from competition and imitation (Rumelt 
1984). However, strategy theories have been largely silent on why some firms are able to identify and 
acquire these resources at a lower cost than the value they generate (Barney 1986, Denrell et al. 2003). 
This paper follows recent studies urging examination of behavioral forces that preserve strategic market 
inefficiencies, because inefficiencies are necessary for the presence of strategic opportunities (Denrell 
et al. 2003, 2019, Fang and Liu 2018, Gavetti 2012). This approach has both descriptive implications, 
such as how heterogeneous exaptati n to arbitrage limits explains performance differences, and 
prescriptive implications, such as what firms should do to overcome these limits and gain superior 
performance. Here, I organize the various behavioral failures documented in the diversity literature into 
four major limits to arbitrage. Future research might apply this template and explore inefficiencies and 
prescriptive strategies for exploiting opportunity in other strategically important contexts, such as 
mergers and acquisitions, resource allocation and sustainability challenges.
Finally, presenting failure to engage diversity as an attractive opportunity has interesting practical 
implications. Compared with prevalent but ineffective debiasing and training approaches to engaging 
diversity (Kalev et al. 2006), a behavioral arbitrage perspective (with Moneyball as an analogy) may 
nudge more strategists to evaluate diversity differently and engage in the arbitrage activities necessary 
to eliminate market inefficiencies. This by no means suggests that exploiting behavioral opportunities 
is easy: “what is strategically attractive is so precisely because it is extremely difficult to achieve” 
(Gavetti 2012, p. 14). Understanding the four limits will help strategists to assess their context-
dependent constraints and develop feasible exploitation strategies more systematically. One ambition 
is for the idea of strategy as arbitrage to be diffused to such an extent that it will eliminate inefficiencies 
and allow merit to determine pay and career prospects in the long run, as demonstrated by the diffusion 
of the “Moneyball strategy” in many professional sports after 2003 (Lewis 2016). A behavioral strategy 
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perspective may provide a surprisingly effective approach to help non-sports industries fix their 
persistent failure to engage diversity.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical foundation of behavioral 
strategy as arbitrage. Section 3 outlines CSRL limits in the context of diversity, and illustrates how they 
preserve labor-market inefficiencies, using the case of Moneyball. Section 4 discusses how Billy Beane 
and the A’s overcame the CSRL limits and scoped conditions necessary to exploit behavioral arbitrage 
opportunities. The paper concludes by discussing the broader implications of the CSRL framework, 
including how hype surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) may strengthen various limits to engaging 
diversity rather than weakening them.
2. Theoretical Foundation of Behavioral Strategy as Arbitrage
A central concern of strategy is to develop prescriptive advice on how to gain superior profits. An 
implicit assumption is that the market is so inefficient that it allows profit opportunities to exist. If the 
market were efficient, the price of acquiring resources would reflect the value they create, precluding 
the possibility of obtaining superior profit (Barney 1986). Since firms’ traits and actions are enabled by 
various resources which are ultimately acquired in the factor market, the scope for prescriptive 
strategies depends on the inefficiency of factor markets.
The perspective of behavioral strategy as arbitrage is predicated on an assumption that market failure 
is necessary for the presence of strategic opportunities and superior profit (Denrell et al. 2003). A 
valuable resource may be mispriced owing to “behavioral failures” (Gavetti 2012), such as failing to 
recognize resource value because of cognitive distance or inertia (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). To 
promise attractive opportunities, biases must be difficult to spot or act on, otherwise the resulting 
mispriced resources will attract competition and soon be arbitraged away (Denrell et al. 2019). Superior 
profit is realized when a strategist manages to overcome these behavioral failures through superior 
intelligence and insight, or luck and exaptation, and acquires undervalued resources ahead of rivals.
This perspective resembles and is partially inspired by the idea of “limits to arbitrage” in financial 
markets (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Since the idea of behavioral strategy as arbitrage builds on, but 
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6
also deviates from, the common understanding of arbitrage, I first review the limits to arbitrage in 
financial markets before extending this analogy to strategic factor markets.
2.1 Limits to Arbitrage in Financial Markets
Bona fide arbitrage is about taking advantage of price imbalances in separate markets. Traders may 
profit if they can simultaneously buy and sell the same assets priced differently in different markets. 
Bona fide arbitrage is risk-free for traders who have access to relevant price information and 
transactions. Unlike arbitrage in financial or factor markets, bona fide arbitrage opportunities are often 
created not by misevaluations, but by economic and technological barriers to price convergence. For 
example, traders with exclusive access to a purpose-built cable between Chicago and New York were 
able to profit by placing front-run orders four milliseconds ahead of other trades (Lewis 2014). Traders 
who overcame this entry barrier to superior technology were able to arbitrage the price difference and 
earn risk-free profits. Such abnormal returns persisted until the price imbalance was arbitraged away 
when most investors recognized this strategy and acquired similar technology. This implies that 
attractive bona fide arbitrage opportunities are protected by strong entry barriers. Traders who are able 
to overcome these barriers can monopolize the profit until the competitive asymmetry disappears.
Arbitrage in financial markets relates to how rational traders take advantage of other investors’ 
biased evaluations (Barberis and Thaler 2003). For example, suppose Firm A’s fundamental value is 
$10 per stock share. Imagine that a group of noise traders becomes overly pessimistic about Firm A’s 
prospects, pushing its stock price down to $5. A rational trader, Trader X, can profit by acquiring the 
undervalued Stock A, and can hedge the risk by shorting a substitute stock, for example of Firm B 
operating in the same industry with a similar prospective cash flow to Firm A. If Firm A’s stock price 
subsequently bounces back to its fundamental value of $10 (i.e., when the market recovers from the 
overreaction), the profit earned by Trader X is the temporary price difference ($10-$5=$5) times the 
volume of Stock X acquired, minus the cost of the hedge. If Firm A’s stock price subsequently deviates 
further from its fundamental value of $10, for example due to a piece of industry news that negatively 
impacts on both Firm A and Firm B, and hence pushes Firm A’s price, say, from $5 to $3 and Firm B’s 
price from $10 to $8, then Trader X can attenuate the loss (i.e., the decrease of $2 in Firm A’s share 
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price times the acquired volume) through the hedge. That is, Trader X can sell Stock B at $10, with the 
acquisition cost equal to its current price of $8.
Supporters of the efficient market hypothesis believe that prices in financial markets are generally 
correct because of arbitrage activities (Fama 1970). Asset mispricing may occur temporarily, but cannot 
persist because traders will identify mispricings as profit opportunities and arbitrage them away. Such 
scholars argue that there is “no free lunch” (Friedman 1975): no investment strategy can beat the market 
by continuously earning excess risk-adjusted average returns, because market inefficiencies and asset 
mispricing cannot persist due to arbitrage activities.
However, behavioral finance research shows that “no free lunch” does not imply that “prices are 
correct” owing to limits to arbitrage (Barberis and Thaler 2003, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Traders 
may identify a mispriced asset, but arbitraging the mispricing may be infeasible for at least three reasons. 
First, there is a hedging risk because the substitute stock is rarely perfect. For example, Stock B’s price 
may not decrease enough (or at all) when negative industry news is announced, suggesting a failed or 
insufficient hedge. Second, there is a capital risk because traders rarely invest their own money. “A 
separation of brains and capital” (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) exposes traders to the risk that they may 
lose capital support if their investors are not immune to the misevaluations upon which the arbitrage 
opportunity is based, as illustrated by Michael Lewis’s book, The Big Short (2011). The third type of 
risk concerns implementation: mispricing may occur, but it may not lend itself to a feasible arbitrage 
strategy (Shiller 1981), or the cost of implementation, such as the borrowing cost to implement 
sufficient short selling in a hedge, may be too high. As Keynes put it, “[t]he market can stay irrational 
longer than you and I can remain solvent” (Shilling 1993, p. 236). Overall, these limits suggest that 
although an arbitrage opportunity may exist, it may be too costly or risky to be feasible. A mispricing 
may be identified, but with no profitable investment strategy (i.e., “no free lunch”), allowing the 
mispricing and market inefficiencies to persist (i.e., prices are incorrect).
2.2 Limits to Arbitrage in Strategic Factor Markets
The analogy of limits to arbitrage in financial markets can be extended to strategic factor markets. 
Barney (1986) argues that abnormal returns would not exist if the strategic factor market were efficient, 
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8
because the price of acquiring a resource would reflect the value this resource could create. One has to 
assume factor market failure to allow the possibility of strategic opportunities (Denrell et al. 2003).
Recent advances in behavioral strategy revisit this assumption and illustrate how behavioral forces 
may preserve factor market failures (Gavetti 2012). For example, Fang and Liu (2018) highlight how 
cognitive biases, such as status quo and homophily biases, can be translated into approaches that enable 
firms without structural or resource advantages to disrupt industry incumbents. Denrell et al. (2019) 
demonstrate that the way in which people are fooled by randomness creates an alternative source of 
opportunity, but highlight the sociocognitive complications of pursuing such opportunities. The purpose 
of this paper is to propose an integrative framework based on the idea of limits to arbitrage, and to apply 
it in the context of diversity in order to search for untapped opportunities in the labor-market. This 
builds on decades of research documenting various “behavioral failures” in decision making, mental 
representations, organizational learning and social interactions, but turns these findings on their head. 
That is, behavioral opportunities are more attractive when behavioral failures are more difficult to 
overcome. If these failures are easy to spot and act upon, mispricing and inefficiencies are unlikely to 
persist as attractive opportunities. If they are difficult to overcome, they will create limits that protect 
untapped opportunities from being recognized and arbitraged away. The behavioral failures 
documented in the literature predict both market inefficiencies and sources of untapped opportunities.
To illustrate some of these behavioral failures, consider a thought experiment. Let us assume that 
resource X is valuable—obtaining X will increase a firm’s sales revenue or decrease its production cost, 
or both. Much of the strategy research focuses on how firms may develop capacity to sense, seize and 
integrate resource X as a profit opportunity (Teece et al. 1997). However, Barney’s critique (1986) 
holds that resource X’s expected profit-generation capacity will approach zero if many firms can sense, 
seize and integrate resource X. For resource X to remain attractive, one must focus on failures—namely, 
why many firms fail to sense, fail to seize, or fail to integrate resource X to such an extent that resource 
X remains mispriced or underutilized relative to the value it can generate.
Firms may fail to sense resource X’s value owing to various rationality bounds. No firm with 
unlimited cognitive capacity to evaluate every resource carefully would overlook resource X. 
Boundedly rational individuals and firms may overlook resource X because they have to simplify the 
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world through cognitive shortcuts, such as decision heuristics and mental representations (Gavetti 2012, 
Kahneman 2011). These simplifications may be fast and frugal heuristics if decision makers are able to 
modify them over time through immediate and reliable feedback (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). 
Otherwise, they are likely to create systematic mistakes and blind spots that are shared by many 
individuals and firms as a result of superstitious learning, imitation and diffusion (Kahneman et al. 
1982, Levinthal and March 1993, Zuckerman 2012). For example, firms tend to cluster around a few 
strategic groups, and firms within such groups usually develop and share similar mental models, such 
as how to compete in their industry (Porac et al. 1995). If resource X is cognitively proximate to these 
firms, most of them will sense and compete for it, making its superior profit-generating capacity self-
defeating. A necessary condition for resource X to remain valuable is that it is cognitively distant from 
these firms, so they will systematically overlook it owing to the bounds of their shared mental model, 
even though it is easily assessable (Gavetti 2012). This predicts that many firms, particularly 
incumbents that take a mental model for granted, will make the similar mistake of ignoring resource X, 
preserving it as an untapped opportunity.
Even when firms sense resource X’s value, they may fail to seize it owing to various limitations in 
measuring and learning its correct value. For example, firms may not profit from resource X if they 
cannot overcome information asymmetry and distinguish it from the “lemons” (Akerlof 1978). Firms 
may learn from experience to undervalue resource X when its value cannot be accurately estimated 
without complementary resources (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Mosakowski 1997) or substantial 
experience (Denrell and March 2001). Moreover, firms may develop bias in favor of their own resource, 
resource Y, if it has led to prior successes (Audia et al. 2000). Salient success in an industry may also 
generate halo effects and fads, making some resources more popular than justified by their value 
(Pontikes and Barnett 2017, Rosenzweig 2007). These are just some of the traps documented in the 
literature on experiential and social learning. A shared feature of these learning failures is that many 
firms tend persistently to seize less valuable resources, abandon the more valuable resource X 
prematurely, or both, preserving resource X as an undervalued opportunity.
Even when firms sense resource X and avoid seizing the wrong resource X, they may fail to integrate 
and realize its full value due to organizational dynamics. Firms may not be motivated to integrate 
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resource X when their current performance is coded as successful. Even when motivated to change, 
firms may underutilize resource X if it is competency-destroying (Henderson and Clark 1990). For 
example, it may create new products that cannibalize existing products’ market share, or the innovation 
enabled by resource X may challenge a firm’s existing power and status hierarchy. Strong resistance to 
integrating novel resources is to be expected from well-managed firms (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 
Nelson and Winter 1982). Even when resource X promises improvement in the long run (a positive 
“content effect” from adopting resource X), firms may not survive the cascading disruptions to routines 
in the short run (a negative “process effect” from adopting resource X). Underutilization, failures or 
abandonments after seizing resource X may stigmatize it on the market, preserving it as an apparently 
unattractive opportunity.
Even when firms have the capacity to sense, seize and integrate resource X, they may choose not to 
engage it if doing so would be socially destructive (Correll et al. 2017). For example, firms may not 
profit from resource X if important stakeholders discount the output value owing to its uniqueness or 
incomprehensiveness (Litov et al. 2012, Zuckerman 1999). Firms may distance themselves from 
resource X if engaging it implies deviation from taken-for-granted norms or institutional logic (Oliver 
1997). Engaging resource X may be so detrimental to the reputation and status of a firm and its 
managers that they ignore what appear to be obvious opportunities (Jonsson and Regnér 2009). 
Interdependency may also create pluralistic ignorance around valuable resources, where many 
recognize resource X’s value but no one is daring enough to break the “iron cage” (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). Apparently low-hanging fruits are thus protected like the emperor’s new clothes.
I have outlined several behavioral failures that operate as limits to exploiting resource X as a valuable 
resource. These operate as filters: some firms may fail to become aware of resource X due to rationality 
bounds; among those that sense resource X, some may fail to seize the right resource X owing to 
learning traps; among those who sense and seize resource X, some may fail to integrate it due to inertia 
and conflicts of interest; and among those who sense, seize and integrate resource X, some may fail to 
justify it and its output due to deviations from conventions and norms. Strong limits to arbitrage in the 
factor market suggest that behavioral failures may be so powerful that no firm can pass through all these 
filtering limits. Thus, the bad news is that the factor market is inefficient, but the good news is that 
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resource X will remain a valuable opportunity. Until some firms manage to supersede all these limits, 
behavioral failures will protect factor market inefficiencies from being arbitraged away, preserving 
resource X as an untapped opportunity.
This section has illustrated a few of the behavioral failures that limit arbitraging of factor market 
inefficiencies. The perspective of behavioral strategy as arbitrage aims to integrate existing behavioral 
science findings. One analogy is how Porter’s Five Forces Framework turned industrial economics on 
its head, showing how well-known economic forces that are detrimental to perfect competition are in 
fact useful for predicting an industry’s profitability. Similarly, behavioral strategy as arbitrage utilizes 
knowledge developed in behavioral sciences and illuminates how well-known “behavioral failures” 
may help predict when non-economic limits create and sustain strategic opportunities.
Finally, the framework of behavioral strategy as arbitrage is context-independent, but applying the 
theory to search for opportunities arising from particular behavioral failures is context-dependent. 
Given the prevalence of documented behavioral failures, inefficiencies might be predicted in many 
markets. However, context-dependent information and knowledge are required to identify how exactly 
these behavioral failures preserve inefficiencies in particular markets, and how to overcome these limits. 
In the next section, I will apply this perspective to the context of diversity and outline four specific 
limits to arbitrage, using Moneyball as an illustrative example.
3. CSRL Limits to Arbitrage in the Context of Diversity: The Case of Moneyball
Here, I apply the perspective of behavioral strategy as arbitrage to the context of diversity, and 
explore why many firms fail to engage diversity. I follow Jackson et al.’s (2003, p.802) definition of 
diversity as “the distribution of personal attributes among interdependent members of a work unit”. 
Failing to engage diversity means that managers or firms, knowingly or unknowingly, fail to recruit 
atypical but qualified members when assembling a team to fulfil its goals. Note that consideration of 
“qualified” in management is often team composition- and goal-dependent. For example, the 
performance bonus of engaging diversity is greatest when a team faces a complex task and its members 
have non-overlapping cognitive diversity (Page 2017). Since measuring cognitive diversity and judging 
the interdependent merit of team members is challenging, these difficulties create precisely the limits 
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that prevent firms from reliably sensing, seizing and integrating sufficiently diverse team members. As 
will be illustrated by the case of Moneyball, qualified but atypical individuals may be underestimated 
even when their merit is only weakly dependent on team composition and the task is not complex. 
Greater failures can therefore be predicted when judging merit depends on more factors. These 
behavioral failures to engage diversity suggest the persistence of unrealized performance bonuses as 
untapped opportunities. Here I outline four specific limits—cognitive, searching, reconfiguring and 
legitimacy (CSRL)—to arbitrage in the context of diversity. I illustrate their application using 
Moneyball before discussing examples beyond sports.
3.1 The Cognitive Limit
The cognitive limit to arbitrage relates to how boundedly rational individuals and firms make 
systematic, suboptimal decisions when they simplify the complex world through decision shortcuts or 
mental representations. In the context of diversity, this limit focuses on the possibility of overlooking 
valuable but counter-stereotypical candidates (or overly favoring stereotypical candidates). A 
stereotype is an overgeneralized belief about the warmth and competence of a certain category of people, 
usually centering around easily observable traits such as gender, race, age, build or sexual orientation 
(Fiske and Taylor 2013). Which stereotypes are favored is context-dependent, but the presence of a 
widely acknowledged stereotype suggests that many individuals and firms share a similar mental model 
in that context, creating and preserving similar blind spots in their evaluations.
Moneyball. One of the most important sources of competitive advantage in the MLB is finding 
skilled players. The most reliable basis for predicting skills is track record, so players are hired based 
on who have performed better and more reliably than their peers. However, an important limitation of 
this approach is that players with strong and reliable track records, such as incumbent MLB and college 
baseball players, are expensive. Most teams are unable to win bidding wars for these players against 
richer teams like the New York Yankees. Thus, many are forced to search for talent among those with 
less reliable track records, such as high schoolers.
MLB teams identify talents with limited track records by sending their “scouts” to observe high-
school games and report good players as potential draft picks back to the team manager. However, it is 
very difficult to judge better players simply by observing their performance: “One absolutely cannot 
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tell, by watching, the difference between a .300 hitter and a .275 hitter. The difference is one extra hit 
every two weeks” (Lewis 2003, p. 68). As a result, scouts (largely retired baseball players) tend to use 
a representative heuristic based on their prior experience (Tversky and Kahneman 1974): good players 
tend to have a certain “look”, the main feature being that they look like fit, powerful players. This 
suggests that some competent players, particularly if they are overweight, slower or shorter than average 
baseball players, may be skipped by default. In contrast, young players who look similar to prototypical 
MLB players are judged to have greater potential to succeed in the MLB.
Judging talents using a representative heuristic is likely to be a fast and frugal decision shortcut. 
After all, many stereotypes emerge from a strong correlation between displaying such traits and superior 
performance. MLB scouts usually have to travel to hundreds of high schools per year, with limited time 
at each school. The representative heuristic is useful because it helps scouts to screen hundreds of 
candidates by having just a quick look.
However, this heuristic may become ineffective: a blind spot may develop, particularly when it 
diffuses and becomes a dominant mental model for scouts when predicting high-school talents. 
Stereotypical predictions are based on correlations, and judgments based on imperfect correlations will 
inevitably lead to omission and commission errors (Christensen and Knudsen 2010, Csaszar and 
Levinthal 2016). Some players may be falsely drafted if they have the look but cannot really perform 
as the stereotype predicts; this is a commission error. This had been the case for the A’s manager, Billy 
Beane, who had perfectly fitted the stereotype in high-school, but had never lived up to expectations in 
the MLB. Detecting commission errors is not particularly difficult in the MLB, because self-fulfilling 
processes are relatively weak compared with other sports such as basketball (Mauboussin 2012). That 
is, an overrated baseball player is unlikely to meet performance expectations simply because his 
manager, teammates and fans falsely believe he will meet them.
A stronger cognitive limit in the MLB is the detection of omission errors. Some players may be 
falsely dismissed: they might help teams to win games, but are overlooked because they are too counter-
stereotypical. This may happen even to individuals with a strong track record to the contrary, such as 
“submarine pitcher” Chad Bradford (Lewis 2003 Chapter 10). Bradford played for the Chicago White 
Socks and was briefly promoted to the major league thanks to a pitcher’s injury. Bradford’s excellent 
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performance continued, but he was demoted to minor league when the teammate recovered. The White 
Socks manager did so because he attributed Bradford’s wins to good luck, despite his track record. 
Denying competent players despite clear evidence to the contrary may result from the diffusion of 
representative heuristic applications. Over time, fewer competent but counter-stereotypical players will 
be available for observation in the MLB, making it increasingly difficult to correct omission errors. For 
example, a successful submarine pitcher like Bradford was probably a sample of one to the White Socks 
manager. He may have been right to dismiss this atypical case, but this sensible judgment was built on 
a larger sampling bias: team managers could not see Bradford’s merit because he was too “cognitively 
distant” (Gavetti 2012). Yet the distance was created because too many team managers had adopted the 
same mental model, to such an extent that it reinforced a conventional, though flawed, wisdom that 
players without the stereotypical look cannot be good. Counter-stereotypical but competent players like 
Bradford remain undervalued human resources because many experienced managers are blind to these 
players’ merit owing to their oversimplified representations of the world.
Beyond sports. This discussion suggests that recognizing counter-stereotypical merit outside sports 
is likely to be more challenging, because it is less about evaluating individuals’ physical traits and more 
about their invisible cognitive diversity. Consider that an executive wants to assemble a team to address 
a complex task: whom should she recruit to join this team? According to the logic of generating a 
diversity bonus (Page 2017), she should first evaluate the nature of the task, in terms of the types of 
knowledge, tools or experience essential to address this task. She should then recruit members with 
non-overlapping cognitive resources that match the task requirements. This ideal scenario suggests the 
presence of cognitive limits that deter the executive from recruiting a sufficiently diverse team to 
address the complex task.
For example, the executive is likely to take a cognitive shortcut by predicting cognitive diversity 
based on identity diversity, just as MLB managers predict merit using the representative heuristic. 
Identity diversity may contribute a diversity bonus, but its influence is likely to have a mediating or 
moderating effect on cognitive diversity. For example, identity diversity in teams may positively 
moderate the expression of cognitive diversity: people are more likely to appreciate an opposing opinion 
if it comes from a person of a different social category (e.g., status or race) than a similar one (Dumas 
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et al. 2013). On the other hand, people may have idiosyncratic experiences because of the social 
categories to which they belong. The resulting differences in experiences, rather than their differing 
social belonging, may be useful cognitive resources for generating diversity bonuses. This suggests that 
identity diversity in teams is, at best, an unreliable indicator of a team’s cognitive repertoire.
However, people, organizations and policy makers usually mistakenly equate identity diversity with 
cognitive diversity, because the former is more easily recognizable and measurable than the latter. This 
occurs even though research shows that demographically diverse crowds (by gender and race) are 
typically not much wiser than homogeneous crowds (Oliveira and Nisbett 2018). A shared mechanism 
of many decision biases is a substitution effect (Kahneman 2011): humans usually substitute a difficult 
question (e.g., does this candidate have different cognitive resources from existing team members?) 
with an easier question (e.g., does this candidate “look” different from existing team members?). This 
implies that the cognitive diversity of an identity-diverse team may be overrated unless the executive 
resists the temptation to apply oversimplified mental models when evaluating team members and their 
cognitive repertoire.
In summary, the cognitive limit to arbitrage may deter firms from engaging valuable human 
resources when qualified candidates deviate from what a stereotypical, competent employee should 
look like. The limit may be so strong that managers deny clear evidence contrary to their mental 
representations (e.g., the case of Bradford). Thus, valuable but atypical human resources remain 
untapped opportunities.
3.2 The Searching Limit
The searching limit to arbitrage is about how individuals and firms systematically fail to identify 
and seize valuable but cognitively distant resources due to various learning failures. In the context of 
diversity, this limit focuses on the difficulty of identifying undervalued human resources among 
counter-stereotypical ones, and overvalued ones among stereotypical ones. Even when firms manage 
to apply a different mental model and recognize the possibility of labor-market inefficiencies, 
identifying and seizing the right “hidden gems” is non-trivial. For example, the data or metrics 
necessary to measure the value of atypical resources may not exist (Litov et al. 2012), suggesting that 
managers may fail to compute the correct values critical to evaluate opportunities. Moreover, to find 
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the “hidden gems”, one usually needs to experiment with many atypical candidates. This, in turn, creates 
variances in performance sufficient to deter many managers from continuing on the path of more distant 
search and exploration (Denrell and March 2001). Valuable human resources may thus remain 
mispriced, even when firms sense the presence of inefficiencies.
Moneyball. The case of Moneyball is usually portrayed as a triumph of data analytics. Yet the A’s 
and Billy Beane were not the first team or manager to recognize the inefficiencies in the MLB and 
attempt to use data and statistical methods to search for valuable but mispriced players. Many MLB 
teams had evaluated players using available data since the 1980s. The challenge was not that data were 
difficult to acquire, but that many performance measures in the existing data were, in fact, misleading. 
Applying statistics to existing data may strengthen misevaluations because the results look scientific, 
but it enhances only confidence, not competence. Managers need to experiment with alternative, more 
reliable measures to overcome the searching limit, but such activities entice them into various learning 
traps that deter them from seizing the right “hidden gems”.
Take hitters’ statistics for example. Hitters are evaluated on both their offensive and defensive 
capacity, and two performance measures are widely used. On the offensive side, a good hitter is 
expected to have a high average runs batted in (RBI) score, which credits a hitter for making a play that 
allows runs to be scored. The problem with this measure is that it correlates not only with the hitter’s 
offensive capacity, but also with his teammates’ capacity. To gain a higher RBI, a hitter needs more of 
his teammates to be on base in the first place. A good hitter may be undervalued if he happens to be in 
a less resourceful team with fewer competent teammates, whereas a mediocre hitter may be overvalued 
if he is fortunate enough to be in a stronger team. On the defensive side, a good hitter (as fielder) is 
expected to make fewer errors. According to the MLB official website, an error refers to a judgment by 
the official scorer that a fielder “fails to convert an out on a play that an average fielder should have 
made”. The problem with this measure is that it is vague and subjective. To make an “error”, a fielder 
needs to be close enough to where the ball falls to allow a miss or catch to be recorded in the first place, 
implying that a fielder with poorer judgment or slower movement may make fewer errors than a better 
fielder. Moreover, the record of errors is determined entirely by the official scorer, who receives no 
feedback on his judgments and is unlikely, in a few seconds, to have the cognitive capacity to compare 
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an observed miss against all counterfactuals that “an average fielder” might have made. The implication 
is that searching for a valuable hitter based on existing metrics may create systematic over- and 
underestimations because many measures are confounding, imprecise and subjective.
Now consider pitchers’ statistics. Many sabermetricians agree that performance measures for 
pitchers are more reliable than those for hitters (Lewis 2003). An exception is for “closing pitchers”, or 
“closers”, who specialize in getting the final outs in a close game when their team is leading. When a 
closer is used and the team wins, it is framed as the closer “saving” the game; otherwise it is a framed 
as a “blown save”. The problems with this measure are twofold: it is based on a small sample size, and 
the framing makes the outcome sound more important than it actually is. A closer is used mainly in 
final innings, meaning that their performance is based on much smaller samples than those for starting 
or relief pitchers. However, their less reliable performances may be exaggerated because of the phrase 
“save”: they may receive too much credit for wins (or blames for losses), even though many outcomes 
may have been achieved largely without their intervention.
Another learning trap occurs when the above misevaluations lead to disappointing performance. 
That is, social learning and benchmarking may encourage inefficient metrics to persist in the MLB. 
When underperforming, most teams follow a standard search strategy of learning from the most 
successful (Haunschild and Miner 1997), such as the New York Yankees. However, rich teams like the 
New York Yankees can afford to keep players who not only do well on existing measures (such as high 
RBIs, low errors or more saves) but also perform reliably well. Learning from these salient successes 
seems to confirm the robustness of existing performance metrics, but this strategy may only work for 
the richest teams that have no need to make trade-offs.
Beyond sports. A specific searching limit in the context of diversity is a misplaced belief in 
meritocracy. There is a “no test exists” rule when assembling a diverse team: “no test applied to 
individuals will be guaranteed to produce the most creative groups” (Page 2017, p. 95). Complex tasks 
require a cognitively diverse team; however, the team’s cognitive diversity cannot be recognized in 
isolation or ex ante, but must be identified along with the team composition and expansion. A 
candidate’s cognitive resource is useful only when it produces additional ideas or perspectives that 
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differ from those of existing team members. Yet cognitive differences that are useful for filling the gap 
are only recognizable after an existing team has tackled the task and realized its own shortcomings.
Rather than appreciating the “no test exists” rule and hiring team members sequentially, 
organizations often believe that they can solve complex problems by recruiting the “best individuals” 
according to objective criteria. This belief holds when addressing non-complex tasks, as the most able 
and creative individuals are expected to master all the skills and ideas necessary to solve the task (e.g., 
a difficult mathematical problem). However, this belief in meritocracy becomes a searching limit that 
deters the executive from recognizing that a better team could potentially have been assembled. 
Importantly, the “no test exists” rule does not undermine individual ability or creativity. This limit 
highlights that the common practice of recruiting the best candidates according to objective criteria may 
create a searching limit. Teams cannot discover their mistakes unless they experiment with candidates 
who are sufficiently different from existing members, or even unqualified based on objective criteria.
Finally, even when an executive correctly identifies that the assembled team is insufficiently diverse, 
she may be trapped by the “hot stove effect” when searching non-locally (Denrell and March 2001). 
Executives may be shocked by hiring errors, because attempts to hire a cognitively diverse member 
usually entail experimenting with many atypical hires. Such experiments may lead to long-term 
performance improvement, but a specific hire may cause an immediate disaster and lead to a premature 
termination of searching.
In summary, the searching limit to arbitrage may deter firms from seizing the right “hidden gems”, 
even when they sense labor-market inefficiencies. Existing data and measures may be systematically 
misleading, but various experiential and social learning traps may deter managers from discovering 
these flaws or from experimenting with alternative measures and candidates. As a result, valuable 
human resources may remain under the radar.
3.3 The Reconfiguring Limit
The reconfiguring limit to arbitrage relates to how firms systematically fail to integrate valuable 
resources owing to resistance to change or failure to reorganize routines. In the context of diversity, this 
limit focuses on the difficulty of fully realizing the potential of atypical hires in teams. Even when firms 
manage to sense and seize the right “hidden gems”, this does not necessarily mean that other employees 
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or team members will appreciate their value, particularly when the acquired resources are 
unconventional. This may lead to underutilization of these resources or even a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
whereby they fail to create value because many falsely believe that they cannot do so. Valuable human 
resources may remain underutilized or abandoned prematurely, even when firms sense and seize them.
Moneyball. Billy Beane and the A’s were not the first MLB manager and team to overcome the 
cognitive and searching limits. Many MLB fans, particularly Bill James (author of the famous 
Historical Baseball Abstract), recognized the inefficiencies in the MLB and created alternative, more 
effective measures to evaluate players. Most MLB teams ignored these advances in sabermetrics. Some 
did follow them, but failed due to the reconfiguring limit: they failed to overcome resistance from 
internal stakeholders.
Take, for example, John Henry, a short-lived owner of an MLB team, the Miami Marlins. He had 
made a fortune by exploiting the inefficiencies of financial markets, and believed that he could replicate 
his success in the MLB:
People in both fields operate with beliefs and biases. To the extent you can eliminate both and 
replace them with data, you gain a clear advantage…Many people think they are smarter than 
others in baseball and that the game on the field is simply what they think it is through their set of 
images/beliefs. Actual data from the market means more than individual perception/belief. The 
same is true in baseball (cited in Lewis 2003, p. 56).
Based on his belief that he could profit from inefficiencies in the MLB, Henry acquired the Marlins 
in 1999, and adopted more efficient metrics for evaluating, recruiting and managing players. However, 
the Marlins experienced some of the worst performances in their history under Henry, and he sold his 
shares in the team in 2002. Henry’s problem was social and political: his approach was so different 
from the conventional MLB playbook, and how he implemented it as an outsider was so radical, that 
the entire team (manager, coach, scouts and players) resisted the change through non-cooperation. 
Many of these internal stakeholders had been successful MLB players themselves, and had benefited 
from the existing value system, such as having the right look or high performance on popular (but 
misleading) measures. They hesitated to adopt an approach that might harm their self-identification, 
even though it would obviously be beneficial in searching for the most important resources in this 
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business. These internal stakeholders defended their value system so strongly that they would rather 
lose games than lose their identity.
Similar challenges had occurred at the A’s before Beane became manager. Beane’s predecessor, 
Sandy Alderson, had also adopted sabermetrics to improve player recruitment. The problem was that 
many acquired players were instructed by the A’s coach to do the opposite of what they were hired for. 
Traditionally, base-on-balls was considered a pitcher’s error and an irrelevant measure of wins. The 
sabermetrics approach suggests that this (as well as the on base rate) is an important measure because 
it is more highly correlated with wins than other popular measures such as betting averages. More 
importantly, high base-on-balls should be credited to hitters, because they are likely to have unusual 
patience and superior judgment that exploits pitchers’ weaknesses. However, all these “hidden gems” 
trained or acquired by Alderson suddenly lost their patience or judgment because their coach, Tony La 
Russa, told them to unleash their natural aggression and swing freely. Alderson never challenged La 
Russa for ruining the recruitment strategy: “there was no very good reason for this; it’s just the way it 
was, because the guys who ran the front office typically had never played in the big leagues” (Lewis 
2003, p. 60). La Russa overgeneralized from his experience as an MLB player, and rejected insights 
from people like Alderson as outsiders who had never been MLB players. The A’s had embraced 
sabermetrics long before Beane became manager, but they failed to overcome the reconfiguring limit 
because possible improvements were blocked by powerful gatekeepers in this sport who disallowed 
changes that contradicted their worldview.
Beyond sports. Recruiting and including cognitively diverse team members does not necessarily 
imply that their cognitive diversity will be effectively expressed, communicated, assimilated and 
integrated. Even when a sufficiently diverse team is assembled, unique perspectives and knowledge 
may be left unassimilated unless the team has a culture or norm that encourages people to challenge the 
status quo and value differences. Worse, existing team members may not understand the logic of 
generating diversity bonuses, and may interpret atypical hiring that deviates from objective criteria as 
discrimination or favoritism, leading to hostility to the new recruit. This may generate a diversity 
penalty rather than a bonus (Leslie 2018). For example, recent studies show that when females or racial 
minorities are hired as executives or CEOs, they may not perform as expected because male or white 
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executives may withdraw support owing to their loss of identity (McDonald et al. 2017). This implies 
that simply including diverse team members is insufficient because of reconfiguring limits.
In summary, the reconfiguring limit to arbitrage may deter firms from integrating atypical resources, 
even when they manage to sense and seize these valuable resources. Resistance from existing members 
may be so strong that the valuable resources may be set up to fail. As a result, unconventional but 
valuable human resources may be underutilized or even stigmatized in the labor-market.
3.4 The Legitimacy Limit
The legitimacy limit to arbitrage relates to how firms fail to justify to external stakeholders that the 
output from unconventional resources is indeed valuable or the process of generating the output is 
legitimate. In the context of diversity, this limit focuses on how external stakeholders may dismiss the 
performance bonus from engaging diversity if they discount or refuse to acknowledge the process or 
output.
Moneyball. One might think that the number of wins is the most important performance measure to 
MLB teams. It turns out that team wins, and in turn ticket sales, are indeed important to their fans, but 
they are not necessarily the most relevant consideration for team owners and management. There is 
conventional wisdom about how an MLB team should be run, and deviating from such wisdom may 
attract disapproval from the MLB “social club” (Lewis 2003). According to Voros McCracken, a 
sabermetrician, the problem with the MLB is:
It’s a self-populating institution. Knowledge is institutionalized. The people involved with baseball 
who aren’t players are ex-players…They aren’t equipped to evaluate their own systems. They don’t 
have the mechanisms to get rid of the bad. They either keep everything or get rid of everything, 
and they rarely do the latter (cited in Lewis 2003, p. 239).
The implication is again “a separation of brains and capital”, as highlighted in the limits to arbitrage 
in financial markets (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Even if managers recognize efficient approaches to 
winning more games and making more money, they cannot convince their owners, who listen to those 
who appear to be more legitimate in this sport, even when their knowledge is outdated or flawed.
The social cost of adopting an unconventional approach may outweigh the economic benefit of doing 
so. Managers who adopt unconventional approaches may not get credit when they succeed. For example, 
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the A’s unusual success—winning many games with a limited budget—became so salient that the MLB 
organized a committee to study this “aberration”, but its conclusion was mainly that “they’ve been 
lucky” (Lewis 2003, p. 122). Many guards of the “MLB club” (such as ex-players as commentators) 
criticized Beane’s approach and queried why, if his approach was so effective, the A’s not won the 
World Series championship. However, such criticisms reveal that they are not fact-based but taste-based. 
The design of many professional sport seasons is structured to mock rationality: successes in season 
games, where the sample size is much larger than in the playoffs, are more reliable (Denrell et al. 2015), 
but teams and fans care much more about the playoffs where the outcomes depend more on luck. The 
MLB insiders did not acknowledge the A’s successes because how they were produced was not to their 
taste. Pointing out flaws in their criticisms would be unlikely to change their evaluations, but would 
enhance “anti-intellectual resentment” (Lewis 2003, p. 99): outsiders who have never played in the 
MLB and know nothing except how t  produce numbers on computers have no right to challenge the 
MLB’s taken-for-granted rules. Billy Beane was criticized precisely because his unconventional 
approach led to successes that humiliated the insiders, and because Beane, as an ex-player himself, 
betrayed this club. Other teams and managers may have hesitated to follow in Beane’s footsteps for fear 
of a social backlash.
On the other hand, managers who adopt unconventional approaches may become scapegoats when 
they fail to meet expectations. This happened to Paul DePodesta, an assistant to Beane at the A’s, who 
was good at analyzing players’ value using sabermetrics principles. He was hired as general manager 
of the Los Angeles Dodgers in 2004, but was fired shortly after a terrible season. The reason for his 
termination was mainly bad luck: several players whom DePodesta hired later proved to be valuable, 
but six of them were injured in 2005. The Dodgers’ 2005 season resulted in the team’s worst record 
since 1992, and its owner, partly influenced by two strong “anti-Moneyball” sports columnists at the 
Los Angeles Times, fired DePodesta as a result. The implication is a typical agency problem: achieving 
mediocre performance by following convention is a more reliable survival strategy for MLB managers, 
even though some are aware of more efficient approaches.
Beyond sports. Even when a team is able to sense, seize and integrate unconventional resources, 
the legitimacy limit may still impede realization of the diversity bonus. The executive must convince 
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relevant stakeholders that the diversity bonus is real. Research shows that if performance measurement 
is based on subjective evaluation or is socially constructed, evaluations are likely to reflect evaluators’ 
biases (Becker 1971). For example, a diverse team may generate a novel artistic innovation that spans 
multiple categories in a surprising way. However, if there are no objective criteria for evaluating this 
artistic output, evaluators may use other cues such as judgments based on creators’ stereotypes, or may 
conform with high-status colleagues’ evaluations. This suggests that diversity bonuses may be 
generated, but discounted so heavily that they are no longer profitable. Take venture capitalists (VCs) 
as another example. VCs may correctly identify the uniqueness of undervalued start-ups, such as having 
entrepreneurs from atypical backgrounds or developing an unconventional innovation. However, they 
may be unable to profit from this superior insight if they cannot convince other investors of its value. 
If VCs rightly foresee this legitimacy limit, they may forgo this start-up, failing to realize the diversity 
bonus despite recognizing it. Similarly, analysts may not understand a firm’s atypical strategy and may 
discount it (Benner and Zenger 2016), limiting the acquisition of diverse assets (Zuckerman 1999).
In summary, the legitimacy limit to arbitrage may deter firms from engaging valuable diversity even 
when they privately know that doing so might lead to superior performance. Self-interested managers 
may choose not to engage obvious opportunities that may appear illegitimate to important stakeholders 
if their incentives are structured to punish unconventional successes and reward legitimized mediocrity 
or even failures.
4. Overcoming CSRL Limits to Arbitrage Mispriced Diversity
The case of Moneyball illustrates how CSRL limits deter many MLB teams and managers from 
sensing, seizing, integrating or justifying valuable but atypical players. These strong limits preserve 
behavioral failures and labor-market inefficiencies, so undervalued players remain untapped 
opportunities. Teams that are able to supersede these limits more effectively than their rivals can 
monopolize the opportunity and earn contrarian profit. This was the case for the A’s and its manager, 
Billy Beane between 1999 and 2003. Beane and the A’s exploited an untapped opportunity in the 
MLB—recruiting and utilizing valuable but atypical players to gain more wins—because they managed 
to overcome all the CSRL limits more effectively than their rivals. As discussed, some teams, such as 
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the Miami Marlins under John Henry, overcame some CSRL limits, but the remaining limits still 
effectively deterred them from allowing Moneyball to occur sooner. As will be elaborated, overcoming 
all the CSRL limits usually depends not only on becoming more rational or strategic, but also on being 
in the right place at the right time: if strategists happen to have “preferential access to the missing piece 
of the puzzle, identifying the opportunity might be easy” (Denrell et al. 2003, p. 985).
In terms of the cognitive limit in the MLB, a shared mental model may have been so popular that 
many teams and their management could not see how atypical players (such as Chad Bradford) might 
actually be competent. What motivated Beane to pay attention to, and eventually adopt, a different 
mental model was largely his personal, idiosyncratic experience. Beane had been a promising high 
schooler, but his MLB career had been disappointing. He knew from experience that the conventional 
practice of drafting stereotypical players with the right “look” was taken-for-granted but flawed. In fact, 
Beane turned his experience on its head by using “his antitheses” as a guide. That is, he sought players 
unlike himself, such as young men “not looking good in a uniform…couldn’t play anything but 
baseball…had gone to college” (Lewis 2003, p. 117). Hundreds of high schoolers were falsely drafted 
into the MLB because they, like Beane, had a stereotypical look, but only Beane took advantage of this 
blunder and turned it into a heuristic that allowed him to see what his rivals failed to see. 
The searching limit in the MLB is about identifying the right “hidden gems” among atypical 
candidates. This task is non-trivial, because most atypical players are not competent, as rightly predicted 
by the representative heuristic. Teams searching for the truly undervalued among atypical players face 
many learning traps. As discussed, the challenge is not only about analyzing data, but also about 
collecting and analyzing more reliable data. This limit was not particularly challenging to Beane. His 
predecessor at the A’s, Sandy Alderson, had adopted sabermetrics principles in the 1990s (including 
collecting, purchasing and analyzing unconventional but more reliable performance metrics), 
suggesting that Beane had already gone through part of the learning curve when he took over the A’s 
in late 1997. Hiring Paul DePodesta, a Harvard-trained economist, as his assistant improved the A’s 
efficiency in searching for undervalued players, but was probably not essential for the A’s success, 
since many fans would have loved to contribute equivalent skill and knowledge freely to any MLB 
team willing to listen to them.
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What is more surprising is Beane’s strategic exploitation of rivals being constrained by the searching 
limit. As discussed, many closing pitchers may be overvalued because their performance is based on a 
small sample size and is sensitive to framing. Beane reassigned some of the A’s above-average relief 
pitchers as closers, and many soon seemed more valuable than they actually were. Rivals that persisted 
in using the number of games “saved” were fooled and became overenthusiastic when Beane proposed 
deals to trade these closers. The A’s benefited from this “sell high” strategy and winner’s curse in trades. 
Good deals based on apparent but misleading superior performance were engineered to allow the A’s 
to gain more resources to recruit undervalued players.
What deterred some teams (such as the Marlins) from exploiting inefficiencies in the MLB ahead of 
Beane was the reconfiguring limit. In fact, the A’s had been deterred by the same limit before Beane 
took over because their coach, Tony La Russa, had refused to utilize competent but atypical players 
hired by Alderson. The solution was to replace him with a low-profile coach, Art Howe, who “was 
hired to implement the ideas of the front office” (Lewis 2003, p.61). Beane also ensured that incentives 
were structured to reward players for delivering what they were hired for, such as high base-on-balls, 
and to punish them if they followed the conventional playbook, which actually harmed performances, 
such as stealing bases or sacrificing strikes. Importantly, unlike Alderson, Beane had the authority to 
implement this unconventional strategy: he had been an MLB player himself, and everyone knew he 
“was the guy destined for the Hall of Fame who never panned out” (Lewis 2003, p.57). He was a living 
example of the inadequacy of the conventional MLB playbook for scouts and players at the A’s. Beane 
also facilitated the integration of atypical players by reducing the influence of his own biases. Knowing 
that his own judgments might also be influenced by stereotypes, Beane tended to meet the players he 
hired infrequently. By reducing his exposure to salient but misleading cues, he was more likely to 
evaluate and utilize players based on their contributions to wins, rather than by their “look”.
Finally, the legitimacy limit was very strong in the MLB. The MLB playbook probably only worked 
for the richest teams, but other teams felt pressured to follow these rules, even though some may have 
privately known that they were not the most efficient (Correll et al. 2017). The fact that Beane managed 
one of the poorest teams in the MLB and could not afford to go after the same players as other teams 
probably enabled the A’s to overcome the legitimacy limit more effectively than their rivals. Owing to 
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the resource constraint, the A’s owner ignored journalists’ criticisms of Beane’s approach and allowed 
him to experiment with different types of players to enhance performance, effectively relaxing this 
limit. Moreover, Beane utilized the A’s underdog status to his advantage: he justified his acquisition of 
apparently flawed players by his lack of resources. The A’s management got excited when they realized 
that the “flaw” that caused rivals to discount some players in the deals was “something that just doesn’t 
matter” (Lewis 2003, p. 116). The A’s deal counterparts were fooled because they believed that 
pursuing “flawed” players was a legitimate move for resource-poor teams like the A’s.
In summary, Billy Beane and the A’s managed to overcome all the CSRL limits in the MLB and 
monopolized an untapped opportunity. The A’s won many games despite having one of the lowest 
payrolls, as it systematically acquired players from rivals at a lower price than implied by their 
contributions to winning. Beane’s idiosyncratic experiences and the A’s circumstances enabled them to 
be less blind and less constrained, all wing them to exploit the opportunity. How Beane strategized 
with his experience and circumstances also played an important role in integrating and justifying the 
atypical resources more effectively than their predecessors. Overall, planned and unplanned behavioral 
asymmetry between Beane, the A’s and other MLB teams and managers explains why it was Beane 
who successfully exploited this opportunity.
This discussion of factors contributing to the success of the A’s and Beane also potentially reconciles 
two competing views on the origin of great strategies and performance. Many strategy researchers 
consider great strategies to be “rooted in meaningful departures from a prevailing status quo—the 
cognitions, practices, routines, and institutions that stabilize a market or competitive order at any given 
point in time” (Gavetti and Porac 2018, p. 354). They suggest systematic pathways to greatness, such 
as by deepening, extending or replacing the existing market or competitive order (p. 364). An alternative, 
more pessimistic view is that there is no such systematic pathway (Andriani and Cattani 2016, Denrell 
et al. 2003, March 2006). As the case of Moneyball illustrates, Beane’s and the A’s departure from the 
status quo was a mixture of exaptation (e.g., turning personal failure into unique insights into 
inefficiencies), luck (happening to be in a poor team with an enlightened predecessor as mentor and a 
less hands-on team owner) and strategy (e.g., Beane maximized returns from his (un)fortunate 
experiences and his team’s limited resources). Exceptional performance is likely to occur in exceptional 
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circumstances (Denrell and Liu 2012), implying that great strategies can improve performance, but are 
insufficient to achieve great performance. Great performance, such as radical innovation, exceptional 
growth/return or unprecedented achievements, is more likely to occur in contexts where most firms are 
deterred by various limits in cognitions, practices, routines, and institutions, except for a few that 
happen to overcome the limits by being closer to the right time and right place.
This view should not discourage strategists, as it just adds one more clue to solving the strategic 
paradox that attractive opportunities should not be easy to exploit. Popular strategy theories teach us 
that attractive industry opportunities are protected by strong limits that deter entry (Porter 1980), and 
that attractive resource opportunities are protected by strong limits that deter imitation and substitution 
(Barney 1991). The behavioral strategy as arbitrage perspective resembles this logic and suggests that 
attractive behavioral opportunities cannot be low-hanging fruit, but must be protected by strong limits 
that deter deliberation, learning, changes and being contrarian. Whoever can overcome all these limits 
will monopolize the contrarian profit. Addressing the strategic paradox is challenging, and this paper 
contributes an overlooked piece to the puzzle of searching for greatness by looking for sticky behavioral 
failures that may help strategists identify untapped trategic opportunities.
5. In Search of Behavioral Arbitrage Opportunities
This paper introduces four limits—cognitive, searching, reconfiguring and legitimacy—that deter 
firms from engaging diversity. These operate like filters (see Figure 1): some firms may fail to sense 
valuable diversity due to cognitive distance; for those that sense it, some may fail to seize the truly 
valuable opportunities owing to the difficulty of overcoming learning traps when experimenting with 
atypical resources; for those that sense and seize valuable diversity, some may fail to integrate it due to 
internal resistance to change or disrupted routines; for those that sense, seize and integrate valuable 
diversity, some may fail to justify to important stakeholders that engaging these atypical resources is 
legitimate. The CSRL limits may be so strong that no firm can overcome them all, protecting the 
untapped opportunity of valuable diversity from being arbitraged away, sometimes for years as in the 
case of Moneyball. This is bad news for labor-market efficiencies and meritocracy, but good news for 
strategists who understand the CSRL framework when searching for behavioral arbitrage opportunities.
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[Insert Figure 1 here]
More generally, the perspective of behavioral strategy as arbitrage provides a template for searching 
for systematic behavioral failures and, in turn, untapped opportunities. The focus of this paper is on 
how CSRL limits preserve labor-market inefficiencies and behavioral opportunities. It extends previous 
work on behavioral finance and strategy to the context of diversity, and argues that the various 
behavioral failures identified in the diversity literature may become a guide to untapped opportunities. 
Future research might utilize this approach and outline the specific limits that preserve inefficiencies in 
strategically relevant contexts.
Importantly, untapped strategic opportunities are not necessarily tied to any particular approach (e.g., 
wisdom of the crowd trumps experts), method (e.g., data analytics trumps conventional evaluations) or 
presumption (e.g., diversity enhances performance). “Astroball” (Reiter 2018), an update of the 
evolution of the Moneyball strategy, illustrates how one of the worst-performing MLB teams, the 
Houston Astros, won the 2017 World Series by rediscovering the value of scouts’ judgment. Untapped 
opportunities emerge when too many people share similar enthusiasms for a particular approach, 
method or presumption (e.g., replacing scouts with data analytics) to such an extent that all alternatives 
become too “cognitively distant” to them. For example, when the Moneyball strategy became a “fad” 
after 2003, scouts’ inputs into hiring decisions were severely marginalized and underestimated. Thus 
opportunities exist for those who are willing to try (and are capable of) becoming contrarian, as the 
Houston Astros did. Nevertheless, the Astros’ success may trigger another cycle of diffusion, imitation 
and socialization, and a new set of CSRL limits as well as strategic opportunities. To paraphrase Mark 
Twain, as a strategist, “whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority”, it is time to search for 
contrarian opportunity.
This perspective urges researchers and practitioners to focus on failures in searching for attractive 
strategic opportunities. Greater difficulty in overcoming the limits predicts inefficiencies, which is bad 
news; but the good news is that the same behavioral failures also predict more attractive, untapped 
opportunities. This paper thus provides a stepping stone for future theoretical and empirical research on 
behavioral sources of competitive advantage by translating well-known behavioral failures into 
roadmaps for strategic opportunities.
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Behavioral strategy as arbitrage also contributes to the diversity literature by providing a distinct 
perspective that complements the two mainstream views of why firms should engage diversity. Much 
research and many practices address diversity from a normative, justice-centric perspective (Nkomo et 
al. 2019), stipulating that firms should encourage the inclusion of individuals with certain disadvantaged 
social identities, such as female, black or immigrant. Others emphasize a pragmatic, performance-
centric view (Page 2017), stating that firms that engage diversity—solving complex tasks by assembling 
cognitively diverse teams—are likely to earn a performance bonus. Behavioral strategy as arbitrage 
suggests that both perspectives are incomplete. Taking a normative but behaviorally naïve perspective 
on organizations has been shown to backfire: doing the right thing, such as fixing historical social 
injustice through affirmative action, without considering the CSRL limits may reinforce rather than 
attenuate the disadvantages of certain identity groups (Dobbin et al. 2015). One challenge is that many 
who take a normative stance believe that “pragmatic logics carry less weight than normative arguments” 
(Page 2017, p. 6). This belief may also create greater CSRL limits, because those who have a perceived 
moral high ground are more likely to make biased judgments and discount viable alternatives if 
something does not fit their moral values. This is known as the “paradox of meritocracy” (Castilla and 
Benard 2010). On the other hand, the pragmatic view does not yet address the behavioral and social 
limits associated with exploiting the performance bonus from engaging diversity. The logic of 
generating a diversity bonus may be clear theoretically, but behavioral failures prevent these bonuses 
from being exploited practically. The perspective of behavioral strategy as arbitrage illuminates the 
importance of unpacking the forces that generate behavioral failures when engaging diversity in order 
to do the right thing, improve performance, or both. Organizations should also clearly distinguish 
between normative and pragmatic perspectives, because being stuck in the middle creates greater CSRL 
limits.
Finally, recent hype around AI serves as an interesting illustration of the relevance of CSRL limits. 
Many AI algorithms, similar to human cognitions, predict behaviors or categories based on 
simplifications of complex reality and generalizations of the inferences obtained. Although effective in 
many ways, this simplification may create overgeneralization and predictable blind spots. For example, 
algorithms can only optimize what can be quantified, but many subtle characteristics, such as cognitive 
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diversity in teams, cannot yet be measured and quantified reliably, leading to systematic misevaluations 
by naïve AI users. Moreover, AI is only as smart as the data it is fed, but existing data may reflect 
decades of accumulated human biases and social injustice. This is why Amazon ditched its AI recruiting 
tool that favored males for technical jobs. This incident also suggests that less salient biases than gender 
stereotypes may be utilized by algorithms, creating subtle “iron cages” that trap future generations. 
Even if strategists overcome the cognitive and searching limits in algorithms, it is still challenging for 
existing organizations to integrate and adapt to AI. For example, who should be held accountable when 
AI predictions go wrong, particularly when the algorithms are too sophisticated to be comprehended by 
managers and stakeholders, such as predictions based on deep learning algorithms? Although some 
managers appreciate these concerns about AI, they may be forced to adopt it prematurely when investors 
or the media uncritically believe that AI combined with big data is the solution to every problem. 
Unfortunately, taken together, the hype surrounding AI may actually reinforce existing CSRL limits 
that deter firms from engaging diversity. However, the good news is that these limits also preserve 
attractive, untapped opportunities for firms that are able to predict results based on algorithms that allow 
enriched representations, to sanitize big but polluted data, to redesign organizational structures to adapt 
to AI, and to rebel against the myths of AI and their true believers.
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